Turkey: On the March 31st Local Elections
Following the general elections of 2023, in an article from the 4th issue of Komünist Parti titled “The Crisis of the Bourgeoisie in Turkey”, we wrote:
“One of the internal contradictions of the Turkish bourgeoisie is between the organizations of the industrial bosses. The big industrialists have traditionally been organized in TÜSİAD, which was founded in 1971 and has more than 2,100 members, representing 4,500 companies that carry out 80% of foreign trade, employ 50% of the workforce and pay 80% of corporate taxes. In contrast, a new, relatively small but rapidly growing group of bosses is organized in MÜSİAD, which was founded in 1990 and has 13,000 members controlling 60,000 companies. TÜSİAD declares itself secular and pro-Western, while MUSIAD is Islamist and pro-government.
“On the external front, TÜSİAD favors close relations with the West, especially the US, while MÜSİAD supports the policies of the current government, which aims to become a relatively independent regional imperialist power.
“… Erdoğan’s first move after the elections was to extend an olive branch to the big bourgeoisie. Mehmet Şimsek, known for his closeness to rigid Western-style economic policies, was appointed as the powerful Minister of Treasury and Finance…
“…TÜSİAD immediately accepted Erdoğan’s generous offer, calling for stability and reform. Some opposition journalist and economists went even further and endorsed Mehmet Şimsek’s appointment, saying ‘we are all in the same boat’.”
After nearly a year in which bourgeois politics was less polarized than before the 2023 elections, the local elections have painted a picture with important clues about the future of Turkish politics. We will discuss this process before and after.
AKP’s Performance After the General ElectionsAfter the 2023 elections, ground had been created in the bourgeois political arena that would allow the economic policies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to succeed. Not only Şimşek, but also Interior Minister Ali Yerilikaya and the former head of the National Intelligence Organization, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, were praised by the bourgeois opposition. But Şimsek and his team were also faced with an economic situation whose downward trend was well advanced. After 22 years of AKP rule, with no chance to intervene in the cumbersome, meritless and corrupt system of relations, Şimşek tried to keep the economy under control through austerity and interest rate hikes that violated Erdogan’s previous commitments. Şimşek’s policies have prevented the economy from collapsing completely, but have not led to any recovery. Erdoğan was forced to turn a deaf ear to the economic demands of wider society, especially the demands of a raise for pensioners, which he used to be able to accept, even if only symbolically.
Election ResultsThe March 31st elections resulted in an historic victory for the CHP and an historic defeat for the AKP. The CHP not only won most of the metropolitan municipalities, especially Istanbul and Ankara; it also won electoral majorities in municipal assemblies in many regions. Moreover, it increased its traditional vote share from 25% to 38% and emerged as the first party. The CHP was successful not only in metropolitan and coastal areas but also in conservative Anatolia thanks to its racist candidates. The majority of Good Party supporters moved away from their party and towards the CHP. The DEM Party maintained its vote in Northern Kurdistan but lost significant votes in Western metropolitan areas. The drop in voter turnout from 85% to 78% also played a role in these results, as many of those who did not go to the polls are thought to be AKP voters who are unhappy with the economy. The YRP’s 6-7% of the vote did not change the result for the ruling front, but contributed to clinching the defeat. The YRP is a misogynist, homophobic and anti-Semitic party, and its reaction to the AKP government’s trade relations with Israel seems to have significantly increased its vote.
CHP as the First PartyThe election results not only strengthened CHP leader Özel’s position considerably, but also significantly increased the weight of the CHP in the country’s politics. Erdoğan, on the other hand, announced after the election that they would take the results seriously and make self-criticism. Thus, an air of negotiation began to blow across the country. With demands such as the release of Gezi prisoners and the opening of Taksim Square for May Day demonstrations, Özel said he would sit down with Erdoğan and negotiate a new constitution if his outstretched hand did not remain in the air. Although it is difficult to predict what the outcome of the negotiations will be, it is safe to say that the next four years hold the potential for previously unthinkable changes in Turkish politics. Özel, who does not want a new Kılıçdaroğlu disaster, has already announced that the opposition candidate for the presidential elections in four years will be İmamoğlu or Yavaş. It is worth underlining that both mayors are in a much stronger position than before thanks to their municipal assembly majority.
Road Map of Dissident FascismThe Good Party suffered perhaps the biggest defeat in the elections. The scale of the defeat was such that Meral Akşener had to declare that she would not run for the position of party chairman again and lead her party to an extraordinary convention. Since announcing that it would not support the CHP in the elections, the Good Party has lost many of its key members to the CHP and is facing an existential crisis. Yavaş, the Grey Wolf mayor of Ankara, has become the favorite leader of opposition fascism. The biggest threat to the Good Party is that opposition fascists are gathering around Yavaş in the CHP instead of the Good Party. As a result, two candidates competed in the extraordinary congress of the Good Party: Musavat Dervişoğlu, who was supported by Akşener and agreed with the party’s electoral strategy, and Koray Aydın, who criticized the party’s electoral strategy for being too hard on the CHP. Akşener’s candidate, Dervişoğlu, was the winner at the congress, where the options of making the Good Party tail the CHP or the AKP, or perhaps a “free and independent” party were put to a vote. Dervişoğlu is unlikely to stop the blood loss in the Good Party. Another possible destination for dissident fascists, apart from the Good Party and CHP, is the Victory Party, which stands out for its xenophobia and has maintained its strength in the municipal assembly elections. The road map that dissident fascism will follow is of great importance for the future of bourgeois politics in Turkey.
Elections and the Trade Union MovementAs we stated in our article “Istanbul Municipal Workers Strike Against Social-Democratic Bosses”, published in April 2021: “The leftist DİSK is not only prepared to be a regime trade union, it does not hesitate to act as a regime trade union because its leadership acts in the interests of social democratic politicians, not workers. However, DİSK and other leftist trade union confederations and professional organizations remain, in many cases, the only viable option for struggling workers. It remains to be seen whether these workers can prevent the left unions from becoming full-fledged regime unions”. The direct impact of the municipal elections on the trade union movement will be the increase in the growth of the DİSK-affiliated Genel-İş union in CHP municipalities. Genel-İş is one of the unions within DİSK with the closest ties to the CHP. Nevertheless, as in the past, there will still be struggling workers among Genel-İş members who will take a stand against the leadership of the union and the confederation. The greater danger is the growing influence of the CHP on DİSK—which emerged from the elections with considerable strength—an influence that has led to, for example, dialogue with TÜSİAD, which was criticized at the last DİSK general assembly.
The Illusion of Victory Serves the BourgeoisieThe March 31st elections were considered a great victory by the broad opposition masses, especially by all the colors of the bourgeois left. This is an illusion and serves the Turkish bourgeoisie, especially the big TÜSİAD confederation. The working class of Turkey has gained nothing in these elections, just like in past elections and just like it won’t in future elections. Already in 1920, in the “Theses of the Abstentionist Communist Fraction”, our line wrote:
“The electoral conquest of local governmental bodies entails the same inconveniences as parliamentarism but to an even greater degree. It cannot be accepted as a means of action against bourgeois power for two reasons: 1) these local bodies have no real power but are subjected to the State machine, and 2) although the assertion of the principle of local autonomy can cause some embarrassment for the ruling bourgeoisie, such a method would have the result of providing it with a base of operations in its struggle against the establishment of proletarian power and is contrary to the communist principle of centralized action”.
Accordingly, of course, the transfer of the State institutions called municipalities from one bourgeois party to another can only mean a false victory for the proletariat. The will of Capital always emerges from the ballot box, and municipal elections are, by no means, an exception.