The Course of Global Capitalism: An Overview
After the recession of 2019-20 in 2021, industrial production recovered strongly. This came at the cost of general chaos, which led to high price inflation in commodities, energy and agricultural products. The response of the central banks-the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England-was to gradually raise interest rates until they reached 5 percent and 5.5 percent for the Fed and 4.5 percent and 4.75 percent for the ECB in 2023.
The combined result of inflation and rising interest rates has been not only a sharp slowdown in household consumption and economic activity, but a return to recession. This in turn was reflected on the countries that served as subcontractors to the big imperialist countries, which transferred part of their industry there. China, for example, the new imperialist giant, has been in recession since 2019; so are Poland and Belgium, which together with Flanders produce a whole range of goods that the old imperialist countries like Britain, France and Italy no longer produce. The same goes for Mexico, North America and so on. Only Turkey, with its devalued currency, seems to be avoiding recession for the time being.
Rising interest rates have led to the 20-30% devaluation of trillions of dollars of bonds, with interest rates close to zero, if not negative, causing the collapse of major regional banks in the United States and Credit Suisse, Switzerland’s second largest bank.
This same rise in interest rates, making access to credit more difficult, is leading to a record number of business failures around the world. In France, the number of business failures increased by 35 percent in 2023, to 55,000, and is expected to rise to more than 60,000 in 2024. In the United States, the increase in bankruptcies was 40% in 2023 and is expected to rise 28% in 2024. In Germany and the Netherlands, bankruptcies increased by 23% and 52%, respectively. The year 2024 began with a higher level of insolvencies worldwide than before the pandemic. According to statistics from the insurance company Allianz Trade, the number of companies in trouble, that is, having difficulty repaying their debts, is 15 percent in the United Kingdom, 14 percent in France, 9 percent in Italy, and 7 percent in Germany.
Since the great international crisis of 1974-75, world capitalism has been running on debt, a level of indebtedness that has accelerated since the great international recession of 2008-2009. By 2022, some of the debt incurred during the epidemic had been repaid. A table showed that apart from the United States and China, which continued to increase debt (+6% for the United States and +14% for China) all other countries except Russia reduced their debt. Russia, on the other hand, has increased its debt by 25% because of the imperialist war in which it is involved. This will cost it dearly because its foreign exchange reserves are at their lowest and it will be forced to go back into debt to its "friend" China, at rates that are certainly not "friendly".
However, this reduction in financial commitment is only temporary: the forward march of debt is set to resume inexorably. It is in this context that the U.S. government must roll over its colossal maturing debt of $8.9 trillion. Although the dollar is a safe haven currency and attracts capital from all over the world because of its high interest rates, it is by no means certain that the transaction will go smoothly, as the fewer and fewer foreign institutions participate in these purchases. These now account for only 10 percent of the market. Before 2015, foreign investors bought 40 percent of U.S. "Treasuries". China, for example, holds only 3 percent of U.S. debt. And Japan no longer has the resources to absorb much of the U.S. debt. So a collapse is not impossible!
Another deadline: $4.2 trillion of real estate loans, with very low interest rates, deposited in regional banks, are about to expire and must be renegotiated in 2024. But rates are no longer the same, so the risk of default is high. So we can expect a cascade of bank failures in the United States.
As for Europe, it will have to borrow 1240 billion euros by 2024 to meet the needs of its member states. At some point, money will become scarce and very expensive, and the whole Ponzi scheme will collapse. But before that happens, central banks will be forced to resort to "quantitative easing" again, as long as they can.
A look at the inflation curve shows that inflation has fallen to 3.4 percent in the United States and 2.4 percent on average in the euro zone. In China, after negative increases, it is at 0.3 percent. In Europe, inflation has fallen to 3.8 percent in the United Kingdom, while it is at 2.2 percent in France and Germany and 0.8 percent in Italy. Italy is on the brink of deflation.
With the looming trade war with China, which has a gigantic surplus in all sectors, the deflationary process is likely to return. As a result, the FED, ECB and Bank of England are likely to start cutting interest rates between now and the end of the year. This will reinvigorate capital accumulation in the hardest hit sectors, such as construction.
A quick look was then taken at industrial production, the heart of capital accumulation, in the major imperialist countries.
After a sharp slowdown, industrial production in the United States is now practically in a mild recession, ranging from -0.1 percent to -0.8 percent. Compared to the high reached in 2007, the industrial production index still shows a slight increase, of +1.4 percent. However, if we consider only manufacturing production, we note a 7.5 percent decline. In fact, like most of the old imperialist countries, manufacturing production has never recovered the 2007 level. What is no longer produced in the United States is produced elsewhere, in China or Mexico.
Note the decline in increases in the transition from the 30-year "boom" period to the next cycle: in the U.S. the increase halves, from 4.7 percent to 2.4 percent, the result of the downward trend in the profit rate. This decline is even more pronounced when short cycles are considered, although there was a temporary recovery in the 1990-2000 cycle. Another noteworthy aspect is the number of recessions that have characterized postwar accumulation in the U.S.: four, compared with one for France, Germany and Italy, and no recessions for Japan during this period. All four of these countries experienced great destruction during the war, which led to more vigorous capital accumulation and virtually no overproduction crises.
Since the early 1990s, Japan’s capitalism has been supported by "quantitative easing" and, of course, the relocation of some industrial production to Southeast Asia and China. Its interest rates remain close to zero, if not negative, because with non-financial sector debt of 413 percent of GDP and government debt of 263 percent, it cannot exit "quantitative easing" without collapsing. The yen is only a shadow of what it was, trading at 160 per dollar! Despite all this, inflation, which until recently was deflationary, remains moderate, standing at 2.7 percent in February. This is explained by the fact that because wages are very low, workers are not rushing to buy a sedan or an apartment; instead, they are saving and consuming very little. In terms of salaries, for example, a software engineer now costs 35 percent less in Tokyo than in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, and 70 percent less than in Silicon Valley, California.
The result is a recession, with a contraction in 2023 of 1.4 percent from 2022, but 19 percent from 2007. In long cycles, the decline is staggering: from an average annual growth rate of 13% during the thirty years after the war to 1.9%! The decline is even more pronounced in short cycles, from 4% in the 1985-1991 cycle to 0.8% in the last cycle 1997-2007. And industrial production has been declining ever since.
Germany, which in 2018 managed to exceed the high reached in 2008 by 7.5%, finds itself, like everyone else, in recession, with -1.2% in 2023 compared to 2022, but -9% compared to 2018. And again, the fall from cycle to cycle is very evident: from an average annual growth of 7.3 percent in the 30-year postwar period, to 1.6 percent for the cycle from 1973 to 2008, and finally falling to 0.7 percent for the latest cycle.
If we analyzed the various imperialist countries one by one we would find the same picture: for example, Belgium, which in 2021 had exceeded its 2008 high by 38 percent, finds itself with an output decline of -7.5 percent in 2023, which is no small feat. Poland, which was still skyrocketing in 2022 with 10% growth, finds itself in recession in 2023 with -1.2%. Korea regressed by 2.6 percent in 2023 and that Italy by 2.5 percent.
This general recession is reflected in the international trade of major capitalisms, with a sharp decline in exports and an even sharper decline in imports. We can therefore expect an intensification of the trade war, especially with China forced to dump its huge surpluses on the international market.
This system will hold until there is a general, irreversible financial crash that will bring the whole system down. Only then will there be a return to class struggle and the rebirth of the international communist movement.