8. Submission to the Kuomintang

The Second Congress of the Communist Party of China (PCC) was held in Shanghai in July 1922 with nine delegates representing the 123 party members. The documents of the Congress analyzed the political and international situation of China, with a focus on imperialism and the fight against foreign aggression. It emphasized the internal division of China, characterized by the presence of warlords and civil war, which prevented the unity of the country.

A comprador bourgeoisie acted as an intermediary between foreign capital and the Chinese economy. The impoverished peasantry represented the largest force in the revolution, but it could only be achieved in alliance with the working class. The Congress argued that China was in a transitional stage between feudalism and capitalism, and that the Chinese bourgeoisie should fight against feudalism, with the proletariat allying with the peasantry to lead the revolution. However, the documents lacked a clear vision regarding the role of social classes in the revolution, leaving open a possible interpretation towards a “revolution by stages”, like that theorized in Russia by the Mensheviks.

The PCdC decided to join other revolutionary forces, including the Kuomintang, but trying to maintain the independence of the proletariat. A “Democratic Alliance” was also proposed that would unite various groups, but the initiative did not find approval from the Kuomintang and was abandoned. Work in the labor movement remained the main goal of the PCdC, which sought to promote the independent organization of the working class.

Furthermore, internal disagreements emerged over party centralization, with a pro-democracy tendency led by Li Hanjun opposing the centralized vision of the PCdC. Li advocated a less centralized party that was more focused on promoting communism among intellectuals, a vision that was supported by Maring because of his openness to the Kuomintang.

The Second Congress of the PCdC in 1922 accepted the directives of the Second Congress of the Communist International regarding the national and colonial question, but divisions persisted over the tactics to be adopted towards the national-revolutionary movement, in particular over cooperation with the Kuomintang (KMT). Although Maring’s proposal to form an "internal bloc" with the KMT was not adopted by the Congress, Maring obtained a green light from the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) for his line, which included the transfer of the PCdC headquarters to Canton and close cooperation with the KMT.

The ECCI approved some of Maring’s recommendations, directing the Chinese Communists to work closely with him in Canton, where the KMT had strong influence. Although there was no official statement justifying the Communists’ entry into the KMT, the ECCI provided guidelines regarding the KMT as a revolutionary organization, with the aim of supporting its "proletarian wing" and educating future ideologically independent members towards the CdC.

The ECCI instructions, while not explicitly endorsing Maring’s line, reflected an ambiguous and opportunist approach, assuming that the PCdC had yet to be formed and that the Communists should support a wing of the KMT deemed to represent the “proletarian elements”. The ECCI produced Instructions for the ECCI Representative in Southern China, which set out the line to be adopted by the Chinese Communists. This approach would lead to the advocacy of a “left wing” within the Chinese bourgeois party, a position that would, in time, have negative implications for the revolution in China.

In mid-1922, the Communist International ordered the Chinese Communists to “organize Communist groups in the KMT”, a proposal similar to Maring’s that was quickly rejected by the CdC. To overcome internal opposition, Maring convened the Hangzhou Plenum on August 28‑30, 1922, where, using the authority of the International, he succeeded in gaining the CdC’s consent to the tactic of joining the KMT. This meeting marked the beginning of closer cooperation between the CdC and the KMT, with the Communists forming an “internal bloc” in the Nationalist Party.

The decision of the PCdC to join the KMT marked an important turning point: the Communists renounced their political and organizational independence and submitted to the discipline of the KMT. This process culminated in the Third Congress of the PCdC, when the Communists would finally hand over the leadership of the national revolution to the KMT. However, many Chinese Communists, such as Zhang Guotao and Cai Hesen, were opposed to this line, instead supporting the centrality of the workers’ movement. But, despite the resistance, discipline prevailed in the International, and the PCdC leaders, although opposed, accepted the imposed line. Only the Secretariat of Labor continued to oppose it.

Opposition to Maring’s policies was strong in the party and even detested by members of the Central Executive Committee. In order to strengthen his position, Maring suggested expanding it by adding members who were favorable to his line, such as Li Hanjun and Li Dazhao, representatives of the nationalist right. Thus, despite the resistance, the leadership of the CdC gradually moved towards a position favorable to joining the KMT.

Joining the KMT marked the beginning of a cooperation that would see the Communists participate in the reorganization of the Nationalist Party. Meanwhile, at the Fourth Congress of the International, possible Soviet military support was being discussed. The Chinese delegate Lin-Yen-Chin spoke of a “united front” with the KMT, with the idea that the Communists would join the party individually to strengthen the revolutionary influence.

This tactic of infiltration into the KMT, supported by the International and Maring, was fundamentally flawed, based on the illusion of being able to wrest influence from the Nationalists. Radek in his speech criticized the optimism of the Chinese delegates and emphasized the weakness of the revolutionary movement in China. He considered the situation still far from being favorable to socialism or a Soviet republic, and suggested that the task of the Communists was to focus on organizing the working class and establishing alliances with the revolutionary bourgeois forces to fight imperialism. Radek did not directly support Maring’s tactics, but the reality of the PCdC entering the KMT at the individual level of militants condemned the Communist Party to work for the bourgeoisie; it would, in practice, impose the submission of the Communist Party and the Chinese proletariat to the bourgeoisie.

The International, with its “Theses on the Eastern Question”, promoted the tactic of an “anti-imperialist united front”, but without considering the problems of such an alliance in China. The Fourth Congress of the International and the Communist Party of Italy reaffirmed the need for ideological clarity and a strong organizational structure, but in China the penetration of the Communists into the KMT endangered the political independence and effectiveness of the proletarian movement.

In January 1923, the Fourth Congress of the International formalized its position on China, favoring cooperation between the CdC and the KMT. The resolution emphasized that the KMT was the only revolutionary force in China, expressed by the democratic bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the workers. Since the labor movement was still weak, the CdC should collaborate with the KMT in the fight against imperialism.

This alliance with the KMT marked a change from the previous criticisms made by the International regarding the Chinese bourgeoisie. The policy led to the subordination of the PCdC to the KMT bourgeoisie, abandoning the independence of the proletarian movement as indicated in previous Congresses.

In January 1923, the International and the PCdC aligned themselves with Sun Yat-sen, the head of the KMT, who was seeking Soviet support, while accepting that China was not ready for communism. This Menshevik policy denied the adoption of a radical socialist revolution, opting for an alliance with the bourgeoisie.

In February 1923, after the repression of the railway workers’ strikes, the PCdC, despite having a strong influence on the working class, found itself tied to the KMT. The Third Congress of the PCdC, held in June, confirmed this alliance with the KMT as central to the national revolution, abandoning any attempt at political autonomy. This compromise with the bourgeoisie would lead to the defeat of the working class in the repression of 1927.

At the Third Congress of the CCP, many members, including Mao Zedong, gave up on the possibility of an autonomous revolution. The dispute over centralism within the CCP was resolved by adopting measures to strengthen the party center. As a result, some right-wing members, such as Li Hanjun, left the CCP to join the KMT.

However, relations with the KMT remained controversial. Many members of the CdC were opposed to the tactic of entryism, but Maring defended it by arguing that the CdC should focus on the national revolution, joining the nationalist movement and complementing the strength of the KMT. He justified this alliance with his assessment of China’s economic and social backwardness, combined with the weakness of the CdC.

The Third Congress of the PCdC did not completely resolve the issue. While it recognized the need to influence the KMT, on the other hand it criticized its military tactics, which brought it closer to the militarists and imperialists, considered incompatible with a national revolution. The PCdC should therefore have aroused a left wing within the KMT, composed of workers and peasants, to orient it towards a more revolutionary policy.

In November 1923, resistance within the CCP continued. Zhang Guotao rejected the idea that the KMT was the only revolutionary movement and argued that the Chinese bourgeoisie was still too dependent on the imperialists. While recognizing the need to work within the KMT, Zhang argued that the CCP should maintain an independent position, continuing to organize workers and develop an autonomous struggle, avoiding the labor movement being subordinated to the KMT. Zhang Guotao criticized the KMT as not only a false nationalist party, but also lacking in real organization, in fact its first Congress took place in 1924.

Some members of the CdC, including Chen Duxiu, were unwilling to hand over the leading role of the revolution to the KMT and believed it was important to maintain the political independence of the CdC.

However, despite internal opposition, the leadership of the PCdC confirmed the line of the Third Congress, supporting the participation of the Communists in the reorganization of the KMT. In November 1923, the Executive of the PCdC ratified the decision to consider the KMT as the central force of the revolution in China, with the Communists having to integrate into its sections.

The resolution left no doubt about the path taken: all the work of the Communist Party was to be conducted within the Kuomintang, now considered the central force of the revolution in China. The reorganization and development of the Kuomintang had become the main tasks of the Communist Party. The resolution issued precise directives: Communists, while remaining members of the PCdC, were to join KMT branches in centers where they were already present or to create KMT branches themselves where there were none; the program dictated by the KMT leadership was to be followed; and the correction of the KMT’s political tendencies was to be carried out "in accordance with the nationalist principle embodied in the Three Principles of the People". In December 1923, the PCdC issued a circular requiring the participation of Communists in the KMT Congress, which was to be held in January 1924. This approach was accompanied by a theoretical reworking that emphasized the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie in leading the national revolution.

Mao Zedong, just elected to the Central Committee, supported this position, theorizing that the merchants (part of the bourgeoisie) would be the most motivated to fight against the militarists and the imperialists, because of their economic interests. Thus, theorizing a preeminent role for the commercial bourgeoisie, the classical position of Menshevism was taken, which leaves the leadership of the revolution in backward countries to the national bourgeoisie. This interpretation of the revolutionary development in backward countries, according to which the imperialist yoke would have made the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries more revolutionary than the Russian anti-feudal bourgeoisie, in subsequent formulations will be the same with which the degenerate International will justify all the directives imposed on the Chinese communists, which will lead to the tragic defeat of the proletarian revolution in China, while Lenin had already clarified that "the bourgeois revolution is impossible as a revolution of the bourgeoisie", definitively separating Bolshevism from the Menshevik current.