Longshore

On the West Coast of the United States, tension is rising between port workers and their employers. The International Longshore and Warehouse Union, representing the workers, is posed to call a massive strike if talks break down – over 15,500 workers across 29 ports could stop work.

Roughly 350,000,000 tons of cargo, valued at several hundreds of billions of dollars, pass through West Coast ports annually. Disrupting such a massive flow of commodities for just five days could cost firms across the national economy $2 billion, according to a report from the University of Maryland. A strike would also aggravate the ongoing supply chain crisis, stoking popular discontent and putting immense pressure on the federal government. The supply chain crisis gives the ILWU a great deal of leverage, but the union probably also fears public backlash for contributing to rising prices and shortages.

The current contract is set to expire on July 1. Negotiations began on May 10 but were suspended from May 20 to June 1 at the request of the ILWU. The Pacific Maritime Association is representing the 72 port operators, shipping companies, and stevedore companies employing ILWU port workers on the West Coast.

ILWU’s bargaining priorities were set by delegates of the rank-and-file at a union caucus in February. Resolutions in that regard revolved around safety, wages, benefits, and technology. The ongoing automation of ports around the globe is an especially hot issue. The union opposes automation because of the job losses it could cause.

The PMA, on the other hand, has stated on its website that one of its guiding principles in negotiations is automating its ports to handle cargo growth. They also claim that automation will not reduce employment for port workers. But obviously, the point of automation is to increase the amount of cargo handled per unit labor cost, which means greater exploitation of the labor regardless of reassignment, retraining, and cargo growth. Moreover, in 2014, the Port of Los Angeles acknowledged that an automation project at one of its terminals could eliminate up to 600 jobs, or half the workforce.

ILWU’s reputation as a militant union is likely an important reason behind PMA’s drive for automation. Having suffered the effects of major work-stoppages in the past, it’s no secret that the employers would be less at the mercy of their employees if their ports were automated. But automation is also a natural and inevitable consequence of competition, constantly pushing for increases in labor productivity, and the development of science and technology. Such modernization can and should be slowed down for the sake of the workers, but it cannot be stopped or undone anymore than the arrow of time can be reversed. So, the struggle for job security must also include the struggle for wages for the unemployed.

Another crucial aspect of the dispute between port workers and their employers is the ability of companies to reroute cargo through different ports. West Coast ports already lost a not insignificant part of their market share to their Gulf Coast and East Coast competitors as importers responded to overflows associated with the pandemic. Canadian and Mexican ports as well as air transport are currently too expensive to compete, but conditions may change relatively quickly, especially with labor unrest. To overcome these obstacles, port workers on the American West Coast will need to unify with port workers on the Gulf Coast and the East Coast, in Mexico and Canada, and with DHL, UPS, and FedEx workers responsible for air freight.

Amazon

In our last issue, we wrote about Amazon Labor Union, an independent, rank-and-file union created by current and former Amazon employees. The occasion was the union’s certification at the Amazon Fulfillment Center JFK 8 in Staten Island, New York. (It is worth noting that that facility’s management has since been fired and replaced, ostensibly because of their failure to prevent unionization.) Our party considered this event a small but important step forward for the entire working class.

Although other unions have tried to organize Amazon workers, none had yet obtained recognition by the National Labor Relations Board. For example, the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union organized a drive at an Amazon facility in Bessemer, Alabama. Workers rejected the union in an election last year. Afterwards, the RWDSU successfully appealed for a revote, in which the workers again rejected the union according to an initial tally. (However, several hundred ballots are contested, and the official result is pending a decision by the NLRB.)

So, what made the difference?

Three things seem to distinguish ALU from its counterparts:

1. Direct contact and relations with Amazon workers.
2. Advancement of specific demands based on Amazon workers’ interests.
3. Organization of labor actions by the rank-and-file even without recognition (like the 2020 COVID-19 walkout at JFK8, written about previously).

We believe these points played a significant role in ALU’s certification. Of course, we cannot confirm this belief without talking to the Amazon workers who voted for unionization. (We hope to establish contact with a few such workers at the upcoming Labor Notes conference. Perhaps we will return to and settle this question in a later issue of our periodical.)

Since that election, ALU has focused on two goals: organizing other Amazon warehouses in New York and obtaining a first contract for its membership.

First and foremost, ALU sought to repeat itself in a certification vote at the Amazon Sort Center LDJ5, another facility only a few hundred feet away from JFK8. Well, the votes are now in. Workers at the Amazon Sort Center LDJ5 in Staten Island, New York elected not to join ALU by a final count of 618 to 380, with a turnout of about 62%.

It is crucial not to be demoralized by this apparent setback. Instead, it is our party’s duty to analyze what happened, to determine the causes of this unpleasant effect. Towards that end, we will evaluate the situation at LDJ5 as compared to that of JFK8 regarding the three points listed above.

1 There are hints that contact between ALU and Amazon workers at LDJ5 is less developed than it was at JFK8.
    1.a The predominance of part-time employment over full-time employment means the average LDJ5 employee is less interested in unionization.
    1.b Most of ALU’s organizers are employed at JFK8, not LDJ5.
    1.c The attention of ALU now seems more divided between winning the support of Amazon workers and winning the support of leftist political groups, national union leadership, and the media.

2 The demands are mostly the same as before, apart from the demand for Amazon to convert part-time workers into full-time workers, which is well-suited to the situation at LDJ5.

3 There were no labor actions at LDJ5 equivalent to the walkout at JFK8 two years ago.

Of course, Amazon is partially responsible for the outcome too, due to its union-busting practices. But such practices can be overcome, as they were at JFK8. Our party is convinced that if the proletariat moves as a class and takes the right steps, then the bourgeoisie will be so utterly helpless before it that any fight it puts up will be to no avail.

In this case, we believe the right steps are: (i) committing the maximum of available resources to recruiting LDJ5 workers to the movement, reallocating precious time and energy away from non-proletarian politics and media towards more fruitful endeavors; (ii) planning and executing a workplace action at LDJ5, advancing demands specific to that facility – perhaps conversion of part-time workers into full-time workers upon request.

What’s next for ALU? The battle at LDJ5 is not yet over. ALU has verbally committed to continuing campaigning at LDJ5, presumably to file for another election at some point in the future. Similar campaigns are also taking place at other warehouses in New York. Meanwhile, negotiations with Amazon for a first contract for ALU members have yet to begin. The NLRB granted Amazon a hearing for its objections to the election at JFK8, which has greatly delayed first contract negotiations. In our last article on ALU, we printed some of their demands, which will probably be brought up by the union at negotiations when they finally start.

Amazon is likely to adamantly oppose these demands and take a very tough approach to negotiation in general, in the hopes of discouraging other Amazon workers from unionizing. To earn a decent contract and persuade other Amazon workers to join ALU by way of example, the union must lay the groundwork for waging and generalizing class struggles and refuse to shrink away when the opportunity for struggle presents itself. We will conclude by referring the reader to the advice our party offered to ALU in our last issue.

Deere

In The Communist Party, no. 37, we wrote about the 10,000 workers at John Deere, a manufacturing company that specializes in agricultural machinery, who voted by a massive margin to strike last fall. Since then, the workers voted to end the strike and accept a contract which includes a 10% wage increase in the first year. On the one hand, this story demonstrates the power of the proletariat to win concessions from the bourgeoisie through its self-movement. But it is a simplification of the actual events. Omitted are the all-important divisions on the side of the workers, whose resolution is the key to the future of the labor movement.

The workers at Deere are represented by United Auto Workers. UAW’s modus operandi has long been offering concessions from the workers in exchange for job security from the company. This strategy is perceived as both natural and necessary by the union. Indeed, auto workers in the United States had achieved a high standard of wages and working conditions through class struggle, especially in the first half of the twentieth century. Further, the post-World War II economic boom for a long time enabled the bourgeoisie to grant concessions to the proletariat – on the condition that they forfeit their class weapons and commit to industrial peace – without excessively curbing their own profits. Now, that once remarkable growth is increasingly disappearing, so profit margins are becoming thinner and thinner. Companies are therefore more jealously protective of their profits, less willing to share wealth with their employees – for the not unfounded fear of being put out of business by competition. At the same time, with improvements in communication and the industrialization of developing countries, it is easier for companies to relocate production away from combative workers to any place where labor is cheaper and more docile. Hence UAW, like many other unions, has adopted the approach of doing its best to keep the employer happy to at least prevent American factories from closing. Consequently, wages and working conditions have gradually declined, adding up to significant losses for the workers in recent decades. Most of the workers who make up the rank-and-file of such unions have understandably, though often begrudgingly, accepted this arrangement as the lesser of two evils.

After initial negotiations with Deere, UAW brought a contract proposal featuring a reduction of retirement benefits for new hires before the rank-and-file for a vote and recommended approval. Breaking with recent history, the membership rejected the proposal and chose to strike for better terms – against the wishes of the union. The creation of a new tier of workers was the subject of much complaint. Many workers also demanded an end to the already existing two-tier system, which gives different employees different pay and benefits depending on the year in which they were hired. Moreover, severe inflation fueled by the pandemic and the supply chain crisis led many workers to call for greater wage increases.

Over the course of the strike, UAW brought two more contract proposals before the rank-and-file for approval by vote. Both times, the union pressured its members to accept the proposal, believing that if the strike continued, Deere’s offer would worsen, and they might move production elsewhere. While the second proposal was rejected, the third (only a slight improvement on the previous version) was approved. The strike resulted in the aforementioned 10% raise for employees to counter inflation, but the two-tier system and the new retirement plan remained in place.

That was over six months ago. Recently, Deere announced a plan to move all cab production from its plant in Waterloo, Iowa to a plant in Mexico by 2024. Although new projects are expected to replace cab production in Waterloo, it is unclear whether the company will lay off any workers and, in any case, we are skeptical that workers will not have to make any sacrifices. A local UAW official gave Deere the benefit of the doubt in a comment to the media, assuming that no jobs will be eliminated, but said he has not yet spoken to the company.

In a way, UAW’s fears have been confirmed by this announcement. True – Deere has no obligation to meet the needs of its employees. On the contrary, its sole and binding obligation to deliver profits to its shareholders automatically pits the company against its employees, who are nothing more than business expenses to be minimized in the eyes of capital.

However, the stance of UAW and other collaborationist unions is based on a one-sided appropriation of the truth. When workers make demands that the bourgeoisie will not voluntarily meet, they unconsciously allude to the antagonism between the worker and the capitalist, warning workers of the consequences of asking for too much and provoking thereby their enemy. But by calling for workers to submit to company interests as a matter of principle – to effectively renounce their own interests whenever they come in conflict with capital – they deny that antagonism, contributing to the progressive immiseration of the working class.

To appropriate the truth as a whole entails rejecting both the notion of workers being satisfied with submission to capital and the notion of capital being peacefully persuaded to meet workers’ needs as equally illusory and dangerous. Reconciliation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is impossible, regardless of how the classes move relative to each another.

Since our party takes the point of view of the proletariat, we are thus led to conclude that relentless class struggle culminating in the suppression of the bourgeoisie is inevitable. The outcome of the battle at Deere has not yet been decided, but if the strike leads to layoffs, that cannot be pinned on the fact that workers fought for their own interests. (What did you expect?) The real problem is that the workers were restrained in that fight, unable to go beyond half-measures or overcome self-sabotage.

So, what is to be done at Deere? A concerted war against the company on two fronts: labor actions in the American Midwest (there are still many important production lines running at the Waterloo plant) and in Mexico, with workers coordinating their efforts across national borders.

To enact this plan, combative rank-and-file workers in both locations will have to fight not only their employer, but also the unions which represent them whenever they hesitate to engage in struggle. In fact, transforming the unions from an instrument for restraining militant workers and channeling their energy into relatively harmless avenues into an instrument for promoting militancy and attacking at the greatest vulnerabilities of the enemy class is by far the more important task.

Members should organize and pressure UAW leaders to commit to fighting for zero job cuts if Deere proceeds towards lowering staffing levels. They should also call for the UAW to establish contact with unions representing Mexican auto workers, and to set up meetings on the topic of moving production.

In pursuit of transforming the unions, workers should use all the means available to them, including but not limited to officially approved channels – attending and speaking at meetings, forming caucuses, campaigning to reform the union, etc. Different methods may be more effective in different conditions; the best option can only be determined experimentally. Militants should also organize independently of the union, in fractions inside the union that are not subordinate to the leadership, and which coordinate with similar fractions in other unions and with groups of non-union workers. For this coordination to work, it is important that these workers develop their own communication networks, anticipating attempts by opponents to undermine their movement.

Steel

On March 21, 500 oil workers at a refinery in Richmond, California went out on strike. Faced with severe inflation and an especially high cost of living in the Bay Area, the workers demanded greater wage increases. The low wage rate also led to employees overworking themselves, according to the strikers. Another issue raised by the workers was low staffing levels and excessively long hours of work. From the perspective of the proletariat, the labor shortage observed across the country is really a shortage of decent job offers. Raising wages and reducing working hours certainly wouldn’t hurt Chevron’s chances of finding additional labor for its facilities. The workers said that fatigue from overwork and a stretched-thin workforce constitute serious safety issues.

The workers at the Richmond refinery are represented by United Steelworkers. On February 25, USW reached a national agreement with the oil companies employing its members. This agreement laid the framework for some 200 different units, each with its own contract. Every unit still had to negotiate over local issues and ratify their own agreement. Chevron had 35 contracts up for renewal nationally, of which 34 were settled without dispute.

USW Local 5 was the exception. The union brought two tentative agreements before the rank-and-file for ratification, both of which were rejected by majority votes. During this time, rolling 24-hour extensions on the old contract were agreed to by both the company and the union. But after the second “no” vote, USW felt obliged to cancel the extensions and notify Chevron of its intent to strike the next day.

The strike lasted ten weeks. Evidently, the long strike, during which workers had to survive on relatively low strike payments from the union, wore down their determination to obtain a better contract. Chevron handled the work-stoppage slightly better. Their website states that current and former Richmond employees had already been trained to take over the tasks of the strikers and keep the refinery running as part of a company contingency plan. So, Chevron did not need to halt production.

On May 28, the workers ratified a new agreement. The average annual wage increase in the contract is 3%, in accordance with the national agreement. The workers’ demands for a higher raise were not met. We have not found any evidence that staffing levels or working hours will change, either.

We close this article with an outline of our party’s perspective on the strike:

• Having a national agreement between oil workers and oil companies is potentially to the great advantage of the workers. Unfortunately, USW has not utilized it to its fullest extent. The present surge in inflation is a global phenomenon, and many American cities are already extremely expensive to live in. These issues therefore appeal to oil workers not only in Richmond, but at numerous facilities covered by the national agreement. Perhaps the union could keep open the possibility of striking at any unit until all of them approve their contracts. Then USW could have looked to extend the strike in Richmond to other bargaining units by at least making a proposal to do so and consulting its membership on the topic. Work-stoppages at multiple Chevron facilities would have put more pressure on the company to meet workers’ demands.

• Increasing strike pay would also benefit the workers by enabling them to remain on strike for longer periods of time. To do this, the union may have to reallocate funds from other, less productive areas, such as salaries for union officials, lobbying, and unionization drives for the petty bourgeoisie.

More effective picketing would disrupt the company’s ability to use replacement labor, which was key to its success in withstanding the strike. Put as many workers as possible in front of the facility’s entrances to block anyone from entering, especially during shift changes. Draw on the support of other locals to put more bodies on the picket line. Healthcare workers from USW Local 7600 rallied with Chevron workers during the strike – why not ask them to join the picket line? When the company inevitably calls on the police and the courts to intervene, removing peaceful protestors by force, publicize the incident as much as possible and take the opportunity to tell broad swaths of the public your side of the story and call on them for support. Advance political demands like expansion of the freedom to organize, strike, and protest.