Industrial weight and intensity: Cycles of industrial production - The table by industrial weight - Demographic weight - Industrial intensity
We have updated the tables on the industrial weight and intensity of the main imperialist countries, to which we have added some developing countries.
Since we lacked sufficient data on the production of a given set of commodities, we calculated the weight for each country based on electricity production. The result isn’t perfect. Some countries have an advantage, such as France, whose electricity production exceeds its consumption, thanks to nuclear power plants; Italy, on the other hand, imports. However, overall, looking at electricity production gives us a fairly accurate picture.
Another criterion that could be used industries’ energy consumption. We’ll try to compose a similar table as well.
Of course, electricity production, unlike the industrial production index, which is a composite index, does not include the whole spectrum of industrial production.
The development of capital in China has saved world capitalism, extending its cycle by at least 30 years. But capital flows from the United States, Japan, Germany, France, etc. haven’t just gone to China. We can add India, Vietnam, Turkey, Mexico, etc. to the list. So, alongside the countries we usually follow, we’ve added South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, India, Iran, and Indonesia, which, based on their industrial weight, are among the top twenty countries in 2018. Followed immediately by Vietnam, which is destined to become a new Japan.
Cycles of industrial production
| Gross Electricity Generation by Industrial Cycle % Annual Increase |
||||||
| 1960- 1973 |
1973- 1979 |
1979- 1989 |
1989- 2000 |
2000- 2007 |
2007- 2018 |
|
| World | 8.0 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 3.6 | 2.7 |
| World sans China | 7.9 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 1.4 |
| United States | 6.7 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 1.0 | 0.2 |
| Russia | 9.2 | 5.2 | 3.6 | -1.9 | 2.1 | 0.9 |
| Japan | 11.3 | 3.9 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 1.0 | -0.6 |
| Germany | 9.4 | 3.8 | 1.8 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 0.0 |
| France | 7.4 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 2.7 | 0.8 | 0.2 |
| United Kingdom | 5.7 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 0.7 | -1.6 |
| Italy | 7.5 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 1.8 | -0.7 |
| Belgium | 7.9 | 4.2 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 0.8 | -1.5 |
| Spain | 11.4 | 5.6 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.5 | -1.0 |
| Portugal | 8.8 | 8.7 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 1.1 | 2.1 |
| South Korea | 19.8 | 15.7 | 10.2 | 10.8 | 5.7 | 3.0 |
| China | 11.5 | 9.1 | 7.6 | 7.9 | 13.5 | 7.4 |
| India | 8.7 | 7.6 | 9.1 | 6.9 | 5.4 | 5.9 |
| Argentina | 6.2 | 5.9 | 3.0 | 5.3 | 2.7 | 3.2 |
| Mexico | 9.3 | 9.0 | 6.6 | 5.2 | 3.7 | 2.8 |
| Brazil | 10.3 | 11.9 | 5.7 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 2.8 |
The first table shows average annual increases in gross electricity production. It covers the period from 1960 to 2018. It is divided into six periods, according to cycles of industrial production. From one cycle to the next, there is a general slowdown in the increase of industrial production.
The first row refers to the World as a whole: the average annual increase in electricity production between 1960 and 1973 was 8%, then gradually declines from one cycle to the next to 2.3% between 1989 and 2000. It rises again to 3.6% between 2000 and 2007 to return to 2.7% between 2007 and 2018. The increases for the World without China between 1960 and 1973 are 7.9%, compared to 8.0%, then the decrease in increase is stronger: between 1989 and 2000 we get 1.9% compared to 2.3%. The difference isn’t insignificant, as this is a world average. In the next cycle, between 2000 and 2007, there was a recovery: 2.3%, and 3.6% with China. In the last cycle, 2007-2018, which includes the great global crisis of 2008-2009, the decline is sharper: 1.4% versus 2.7%. It’s clear how capital accumulation in China has pulled global capitalism forward.
The other countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, etc., have participated in the resumption of the global increase, as can be seen because their increases are higher than those of the old imperialist countries; in the period 2000-2007, they range from 3.5% in Brazil to 5.4% in India, compared to, for example, 0.7% in the United Kingdom and 2.1% in Russia. The U.S. increase during the same cycle was 1%. It’s therefore China, overwhelmingly, and other developing countries that have driven capital accumulation on a global scale.
Thanks to this “globalization” and “offshoring”, our bourgeoisies were able to limit the damage and avoid collapse following the deflationary recession of 2008-2009! The intervention of central banks, which didn’t hesitate to print money, as well as State intervention, which went into unprecedented debt, wouldn’t have been enough.
The table by industrial weight
In these tables, countries are sorted in descending order of their relative weight in world electricity production in 2018.
In 1960, an overwhelming weight is held by the United States: 36.6% versus 24.5% for Europe, 12.7% for the USSR, 5.1% for Germany, 5.0% for Japan, 3.1% for France, and 2.4% for Italy. In a table we calculated back then (Il corso del capitalismo mondiale, p.83) based on UN data, in 1956 the U.S. accounted for 40% and the USSR for 19%. Such overwhelming weight for the dominant imperialism gave great stability to world capitalism because no other imperialism, not even the USSR, could challenge U.S. dominance.
| Relative Industrial Weight Calculated from gross electricity production (Source: UN) |
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| |
1960 | 1973 | 1979 | 1989 | 2000 | 2007 | 2018 |
% INDUSTRIAL WEIGHT |
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| WORLD | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| CHINA | 2.1 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 4.9 | 8.7 | 16.5 | 26.9 |
| UNITED STATES | 36.6 | 31.4 | 28.7 | 26.0 | 26.1 | 21.8 | 16.7 |
| EUROPE | 24.5 | 24.2 | 22.9 | 20.0 | 18.9 | 16.2 | 11.8 |
| INDIA | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 5.7 |
| USSR/RUSSIA | 12.7 | 14.6 | 15.0 | 8.2 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 4.2 |
| JAPAN | 5.0 | 7.4 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 5.7 | 4.0 |
| GERMANY | 5.1 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 2.4 |
| BRAZIL | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| SOUTH KOREA | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| FRANCE | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 2.2 |
| MEXICO | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 5.9 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.2 |
| IRAN | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| TURKEY | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| INDONESIA | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.1 |
| ITALY | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.1 |
| SPAIN | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.0 |
| SOUTH AFRICA | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.0 |
% POPULATION |
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| WORLD | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| UNITED STATES | 6.0 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.3 |
| EUROPE | 11.8 | 9.6 | 8.8 | 7.7 | 7.1 | 6.8 | 6.2 |
| USSR/RUSSIA | 7.1 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| GERMANY | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 |
| JAPAN | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
| FRANCE | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| ITALY | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 |
| CHINA | 22.0 | 21.6 | 21.5 | 21.1 | 21.0 | 20.0 | 18.8 |
| INDIA | 14.4 | 14.5 | 14.9 | 15.6 | 17.2 | 17.6 | 17.8 |
| INDONESIA | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| BRAZIL | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| MEXICO | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
| SPAIN | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| TURKEY | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| SOUTH KOREA | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| IRAN | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| SOUTH AFRICA | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
Today, things have changed because another imperialist monster has appeared on the world stage and is actively preparing to challenge U.S. dominance and take its place, or at least divide the world in its favor. It’s China, which has overtaken the United States in terms of gross industrial weight.
Another element that emerges clearly from cycle to cycle is the continuous relative decline of all the old imperialist countries. The United States, for example, has seen its relative weight steadily decline from 36.6% in 1960 to 16.7% in 2018. Over the same period, the old British lion has seen its weight drop from 5.9% to 1.2%! Japan fell from 5.0% to 4.0%, still a respectable figure. Germany’s share fell from 5.1% to 2.4%! France’s relative weight fell to 2.2%, on par with South Korea, but is surpassed by Brazil, whose weight rose from 1.0% in 1960 to 2.3% in 2018, but with more than three times the population of France.
As for the USSR, its relative weight increased steadily until 1979, when it peaked at 15.0%, and then slowly declined to 14.6% in 1989, before its collapse. The new Russian Federation has seen its weight decline from 8.2% in 1989 to 4.2% in 2018, almost on par with Japan, whose manufacturing industry, however, has a much greater weight than Russia’s and is more technologically developed.
The other spectacular change is the meteoric rise of China, which in 1960 occupied ninth place in the ranking, behind Italy, with 2.1%, to move up to first place ahead of the United States, with 26.9%, compared with 16.7% for the latter and 11.8% for Europe, which dropped from second to third place. China’s progress was gradual at first, but it accelerated sharply from the late 1990s onward due to the substantial flow of capital from the United States, Japan, Germany, etc. While the U.S. and Europe are in recession due to the 2008-2009 crisis, industrial production will continue to grow in China, albeit at a much slower pace than before 2008, such that its industrial weight will exceed that of the U.S. as of 2011.
The progress of other developing countries is less spectacular, but no less obvious: Brazil, which was in tenth place with 1.0%, has moved up two places, seeing its relative weight rise to 2.3%, ahead of France and South Korea. India is clearly doing better, as it was in twelfth place in 1960 with a relative weight of 0.9%, but in 2018 it jumped to fourth place with 5.7%, ahead of Russia, which is now only at 4.2%, and Japan with 4.0%. Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia are not to be outdone: these countries, which each accounted for only 0.1% in 1960, are right behind the United Kingdom with 1.1% in 2018.
The relative decline of all the old imperialist States is historically inevitable as other countries industrialize, but no
Demographic weight
Again, as capitalism has spread around the world, the demographic weight of imperialist countries has declined. Take the United States, whose population has dropped from 6.0% in 1960 to 4.3% in 2018. This is still a respectable figure compared to Russia’s 1.9%. After the terrible overproduction crisis, which led to the breakup of the USSR, which was nothing more than a conglomerate of nations artificially maintained by the Kremlin’s iron fist, Russia’s population declined dramatically until 2008, and then gradually rose again, but without returning to the 1993 peak of 148 million.
The new big country, China, is also seeing its population decline relatively: after peaking in 1973 with 21.6% of the world’s population, its weight is slowly but steadily decreasing, reaching 18.8% in 2018.
Another noteworthy fact is that India, which accounted for 14.4% of the world’s population in 1960, is seeing its population weight steadily increase to 17.8% in 2018. At this rate, it will overtake China within seven years.
As expected, developing countries are seeing their demographic weight increase. For example, Indonesia’s population increased from 3.1% to 3.5%, Brazil’s from 2.4% to 2.8%, Mexico’s from 1.2% to 1.7%, etc.
Industrial intensity
| % DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN THE WORLD | |||||||
| Il Programma Comunista 22/1957, pag.3 Il Corso del capitalismo mondiale 1750-1990, pag.85 |
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| Years | Unit King. |
Fran- ce |
Ger- many |
USA | Ja- pon |
Rus- sie |
Ita- ly |
| 1870 | 43,2 | 14,4 | 17,0 | 17,9 | 2,4 | ||
| 1881-1885 | 29,7 | 10,8 | 16,3 | 22,9 | 2,4 | ||
| 1896-1900 | 19,6 | 7,7 | 17,3 | 25,8 | 0,6 | 2,7 | |
| 1906-1910 | 14,7 | 6,3 | 16,3 | 34,9 | 1,0 | 3,1 | |
| 1913 | 14,0 | 6,4 | 15,7 | 35,8 | 1,2 | 4 | 2,7 |
| 1926-1929 | 9,2 | 4,4 | 10,2 | 46,3 | 2,4 | 5 | 2,7 |
| 1936-1938 | 9,8 | 3,0 | 8,8 | 36,8 | 3,6 | 10 | 2,5 |
| 1947-1950 | 8,3 | 2,4 | 4,3 | 53,6 | 1,4 | 14 | 2,1 |
| 1956 | 6,1 | 2,2 | 6,9 | 41,5 | 2,6 | 16 | 2,3 |
| 1964 | 4,6 | 2,0 | 6,6 | 32,7 | 4,4 | 18 | 2,5 |
| 1974 | 2,9 | 1,8 | 5,4 | 27,2 | 6,0 | 20 | 2,4 |
| 1985 | 2,2 | 1,3 | 4,3 | 24,4 | 6,2 | 20 | 1,9 |
| 1937 - %Pop. | 2,2 | 1,9 | 3,1 | 5,9 | 3,2 | 8,6 | 2,0 |
| - Rapporto | 445 | 158 | 284 | 624 | 113 | 16 | 125 |
| - Rango | 2° | 4° | 3° | 1° | 7° | 6° | 5° |
| 1956 - %Pop. | 1,9 | 1,6 | 1,8 | 6,1 | 3,3 | 7,4 | 1,8 |
| - Rapporto | 321 | 138 | 383 | 680 | 79 | 216 | 128 |
| - Rango | 3° | 5° | 2° | 1° | 7° | 4° | 6° |
In contrast, British capitalism is well past its time and has turned into a corpse that only continues to walk thanks to the tricks of imperialism. And what’s true for Britain is also true for the old European, American and Russian imperialisms. The French, Japanese, German and Russian imperialisms are practically on par in terms of industrial intensity. If we take electricity as a measure of industrial weight and thus industrial intensity, the French and Russian capitalisms are advantaged by their overproduction of nuclear electricity, which they export. Let’s say France should be behind Germany and not in front, with an intensity not of 247, but rather around 200-210. And Russia should also go down a notch, between 170 and 180, instead of being at 190.
Industrial intensity is calculated by dividing industrial weight by population weight. This parameter shows how far the young capitalist countries have to go and, for the imperialist countries, how much capitalism is in a state of decay. All the old imperialist countries, after reaching a peak, are regressing, a consequence of the relative decline in their industrial weight. The United States, which had an industrial intensity of 614 in 1960, has regressed to 389, which is still very respectable as it still dominates all other countries. China, which has seen its industrial weight soar, managed to overtake the United Kingdom with an index of 143 in 2018, up from 141, but behind Spain, which has an index of almost 168. In this, China is still far behind the United States.
All the developing countries have made progress, but they still have a long way to go before they reach the level of the old imperialist States. Hopefully, the international communist revolution will shorten the road for them.
Iran and Turkey, having multiplied their industrial intensity by 9.7 and 8.0 times respectively, are now tied at 107 and 106. Brazil and Mexico are also in a tie, but after starting from a much higher index, about 40 versus 11 and 13 for the two former countries, they are behind them with an intensity of only 80. Although they have a higher industrial weight, this is explained by a much greater demographic weight than Iran and Turkey.
| INDUSTRIAL INTENSITY |
||
| 1960 | 2018 | |
| UNITED STATES | 614 | 389 |
| SOUTH KOREA | 9 | 329 |
| FRANCE | 207 | 247 |
| JAPAN | 161 | 240 |
| GERMANY | 210 | 221 |
| USSR/RUSSIA | 179 | 218 |
| EUROPE | 209 | 191 |
| SPAIN | 80 | 168 |
| CHINA | 10 | 143 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 344 | 141 |
| ITALY | 147 | 136 |
| SOUTH AFRICA | 170 | 126 |
| IRAN | 11 | 107 |
| TURKEY | 13 | 106 |
| BRAZIL | 41 | 82 |
| MEXICO | 38 | 81 |
| INDIA | 6 | 32 |
| INDONESIA | 2 | 31 |
It’s worth noting that India’s index is very low, 32, on par with Indonesia’s, which is also explained by its huge demographic weight, despite its relatively high industrial weight.
This view shows us how far Europe and the United States have regressed at all levels in their counterrevolutionary cycle, while other peoples are advancing and developing the economic foundations that will enable them to move to a communist society, which of course will require a revolution.
We can also see how the inter-imperialist balance of power has changed profoundly. Russia has become a secondary power, like Japan, which can only align itself with one of the two remaining giants on the track. The rise of Chinese imperialism has profoundly changed the international situation.
We might venture to calculate how much time we have left before World War III breaks out by calculating how long it will take China to overtake the United States in terms of armaments. At a rough guess, by this criterion we would still have about ten years ahead of us. Hopefully, the long-awaited crisis will shake the international proletariat out of its state of disarmament in the meantime.
Everything depends on China, which has largely saved world capitalism so far. In China, however, there is not only a sharp slowdown in capital accumulation, but also a crisis of overproduction in several key sectors, such as construction. This is compounded by significant corporate debt and an accumulation of bad debts in banks. In short, all the ingredients for a terrible overproduction crisis are in place in China; we just have to wait patiently.