There is, in so many reports and studies by the journalistic prostitutes in the pay of the Western ruling classes, a fear that the hoped-for victory over Ukraine’s invader might prelude the collapse of the Russian empire with its disintegration into many small State units lacking strong control, much like those over which the United States of America is able to exert itself in the rest of the world, especially over the European states. A collapse that, in this temper of war and recurrent crisis of world capitalism, could induce a situation of social chaos, with unpredictable outcomes. Joy at the “victory”, but at the same time fear of the consequences. Among other things, the huge atomic arsenal in the hands of the Russian state could disperse, in that scenario, among various actors, with all the terrible risks that come with that.

But we are convinced that just as feared is the social upsurge that may result from such a dismemberment; and it potentially spreading to the Western populations, themselves exhausted by the effects of the crisis of capitalism, the grinding down of the middle classes, and generalized unemployment.

This, too, is probably taken into account. The Party doesn’t take this possibility into account as an inducing event of the world revolution, for which, we reiterate, we consider the Party’s presence and entrenchment in the very core of the international proletariat essential.

Thus, at least for now, on the side of the American and European rulers, the war cannot be extended beyond a certain limit.

This war can be explained on three levels, all of which are valid and interconnected.

It can be read as aggression of one State against another, for different and differently justified reasons.

One is the defense of an ostensible national minority languishing under the heel of the Ukrainian State, which has led to a never openly denounced, but no longer creeping, war fought for years by the Russian-speaking strata in the east against the central government. This consideration can be reversed by attributing its initiation and development to Russia, framed up as a civil war, but whose result was the de facto annexation of the most developed and raw material-rich part.

With an equal amount of historical reasonableness one can consider what’s an inter-imperialist clash between NATO and Russia as an interpersonal one, with Ukrainian proletarians being sent to the slaughter instead of citizens of Western countries.

Finally, as the rupture between Russia, with its extraordinary wealth of raw materials, and Germany, which would bring its great industrial potential as a tribute to this marriage, mixed with the exacerbating fact that Germany is, or was, the leader of a united Europe, thus a potential imperialist competitor of the US, with Russia, and China.

The latter two reasons are the crux of the path of imperialist confrontation on the horizon of this millennium.

Studies, forecasts and politico-military indications from the American side present unconstrained indications of how the world’s leading imperialism is preparing for the coming clash and gathering allies for this purpose.

The war on the European borders has a global figure far higher than the many others going on in the world, including those even bloodier than this one. It’s a crucial event in the process of the world crisis. Its effects on capitalism, in terms of production, trade, consumption and financial dynamics mark an irreversible path.

From the great crisis of 2008, which the bourgeoisies jwere able to control and dampen, to the current one exacerbated by three years of pandemic, there have been successive phases of recovery and subsequent relapse, always at smaller intervals, reflected in a propensity to solve the crisis with war, almost in preparation for the ultimate conflict in the years to come. By 2014, war was brewing in Europe, to give vent to the imperialist tensions that walked hand in hand with recurring crises.

To speak of “reasonableness”, of finding pacifying agreements between imperial brigands, figuring that as early as 2008 war could have been avoided with the right treaties, such as those drawn up in Minsk, is to have no idea of the monstrous force of the contrasts between capitalisms, which go beyond all human will.

Only the international proletariat, with its party, could have, and in the future certainly will have, the strength to oppose the madness of the final stage of capitalism.

Under the present conditions, to speak of “victory” for either side is pure nonsense, a slogan to confuse and deceive the proletariat.

The economic and financial data give an idea of the road Russia and Ukraine have had to travel to get to this point, and indicate the development of the situation.

In Russia, with a fairly stable population of about 150 million, between 2019 and 2020 the GDP growth rate fell sharply, essentially due to the effects of the pandemic, while at same time interval inflation caused a significant increase in consumer prices and a rise in the unemployment rate.

The years ’21 to ’22 saw an apparent reversal, where, however, inflation masked the real dynamics of GDP. In 2022, GDP peaked at $1.930 trillion: hardly a great power figure.

For comparison, Germany’s GDP in 2021, expressed in dollars, is about 4 trillion, the U.S. is number one with 18,000 and China follows with 11,000. These numbers show the economic clout of Russia compared to the other capitalist brigands.

Considering that the EU’s GDP in 2021 totaled $14.5 trillion, it’s clearly seen how the potential Russia-EU link, via the Germany pivot, was a danger that the U.S. had to absolutely avoid.

In Russia, public debt as a percentage of GDP continued to grow: from 2018 to 2022 it rose from 10.3% to 19.9%; but this was perfectly in line with all other mature capitalist states.

However, despite its growth, it’s always been contained and, in the last 20 years, has never exceeded 40% of GDP. Moreover, Russia’s total sovereign debt is expected to stand at $300 billion, according to IMF estimates, with a steady surplus in the state budget.

Another positive figure is the growth of total exports from over $380 billion since 2018 to $467 billion in 2022, while total import volume peaked in 2021 with $248 billion and then plummeted to $157 billion in 2022, a clear effect of sanctions.

Apart from these reassuring considerations, however, it should be noted that the overall market shares of world exports, in percentage, have always hovered around 2-2.5% medium-low values, where moreover it’s thought that a large part of those percentages comes from energy-related exports.

The current account balance, which is small but always positive, gives a clear indication of Russia’s very little weight in terms of capital export; it’s an “old-style” imperialism, more tied to territories than more “modern” imperialism, which is mainly based on the export of capital and “debt”.

But, at least before the deflation of the so-called “Special Military Operation”, Russia was considered reliable and its state debt well accepted by the financial market. In fact, total Russian debt is relatively modest. As of the first half of 2021 it amounted to less than $500 billion, of which about $360 billion was in foreign currency, most of which had been purchased from the United States.

The critical issue is precisely the fact that private and state debt is held in foreign currency.

Trade balance as on the same level, growing from $165 billion in 2018 to $305 billion in 2022, with a severe decline in the 2019-20 pandemic period. The interesting fact is that it has always remained positive: that is, Russia is essentially, with respect to trade, an exporting country. And, at least before the invasion and the subconsequent sanctions, also of good reliability. A financial situation that made it possible in April, when interest on debt held abroad came due, not to trigger the default set up by the West.

The first reaction to the sanctions on energy exports was the demand to pay for gas in rubles, a decision that would have forced Western importers to sell dollars or euros against rubles, with the effect of supporting the ruble’s exchange rate, which had actually appreciated after the announcement. Then the gradual tightening on direct imports reduced this effect.

Although European countries have sharply reduced their dependence on gas from Russian pipelines, they have for now increased their dependence on LNG, which shares 16% of European seaborne imports, paid for in euros at about 20 billion. In addition, the EU still imports 45% of its diesel from Russia. At least until the next “set” of Western sanctions.

This, in the narrowest terms, was the economic position of the invader.

Then came the sanctions, which a US-led West imposed as a weapon of war on Russia, and to which the states gravitating around it bowed. Sanctions, however, have not yet yielded the desired results; GDP has not collapsed as the sanctioners expected, although it has diminished. In addition, many industries have considerable difficulty producing without Western components. But this is a problem Russia will certainly have in the coming months if the war continues to consume resources as it is doing.

These sanctions are harsh enough that, at least at this early stage, they’ve hurt the sanctioners more than the sanctioned. The imperialism that imposed them was the only one to benefit: currently 42% of gas for Europe comes from U.S. LNG supplies at 4 times the cost of what was exported from Russian pipelines, with gains so substantial that some European governments have felt the need to protest, in kind, against this way of punishing aggression that benefits one sanctioner to the detriment of others, damaging them even more than the sanctioned.

But the effects of this practice can be seen precisely, for both Russia and Europe, with next year’s figures. For now, Russia has managed to offset the financial damage both by raising energy prices and by opening up other markets. And there’s been no shortage of ways to circumvent the sanctions, with a financially good position.

On the other hand, a very significant figure to highlight the gravity and depth of the ongoing confrontation is the sanction of movable, land and financial assets owned by Russia and Russian capitalists located outside Russian national territory. As far as financial values are concerned, it’s $300 billion frozen by order of the United States, as they’d already done for Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, in addition to the freezing of 20 billion in personal assets. The mechanism of financial strangulation was then completed with sanctions on the SWIFT channel for international payments, which is totally managed by the US.

Far more dramatic are the economic and financial values for Ukraine.

According to Western estimates, Ukraine needs $5-6 billion a month to sustain the war.

Ukraine had inherited, for the worse, the same corrupt form of the Russian economy. A poor country, despite substantial natural resources, with a backward production structure and endemic unemployment generating heavy emigration.

Economic and financial data paint a fairly critical situation. The external debt required payments of 30-40% on the annual spending commitment with a volume of almost $60 billion, about half of GDP.

The blow of the Russian invasion then compounded this situation.

The highest GDP value was reached in 2021, on the eve of the invasion, at 182 billion, definitely low for a developed capitalist economy. There had been a slight recession, from 135 billion to 132 billion in 2019-20.

Inflation for consumer prices had been ever-present, spiking from 14% in 2017 to 10% in 2021, perhaps the best period for Ukraine – albeit with the ongoing civil war that the West pretended not to see, even though it was already actively working to support it – until it soared in 2022, with a 30% increase.

Likewise, unemployment, which had remained at a level of 9-10%, reached 20% after the invasion, moreover in the general mobilization regime that’s in place in the country.

The trade balance has always, from 2017 to the present, had negative values, with a negative maximum in 2019 of 12.5%; today it is 5.5%, but this is insignificant for the small volumes involved.

Public debt is 90% of GDP this year. Practically a failure. Such percentages can be afforded by the big imperialist states, but not derelict Ukraine: U.S., year 2021, public debt/GDP 127%, but tractable disregard for the damages this causes on economies in the rest of the world; the problems of the dollar are the problems of others, not the U.S.

In this situation there’s little point in talking about prospects and forecasts. The volume of aid, in terms of armaments and financial supports, which allow the war to go on for as long as it has, make any projection unreliable.

But, as “Il Sole 24 Ore” wrote, things are not so bad for Ukraine. Its currency, the hryvnia, hasn’t become waste paper, inflation is at the level of Baltic countries, which are not at war – but all of Europe, broadly speaking, is at war – foreign exchange reserves are holding up and GDP has not collapsed.

Ukraine has received as of October, but other disbursements are awaiting approval by Western governments, as much as $23 billion, 12% of its prewar GDP, in addition to arms supplies, and in 2023 the United States has committed to monthly disbursements of $1.5 billion. Clearly, data cannot be well estimated under such artificially held conditions.

How much of a hold on the industrial component can then be estimated with the bombing of the electrical infrastructure is unknown. The “grain corridor” continues to be open, allowing its export, thanks to brokered agreements with Turkey. This provides for now, at least as long as this agreement holds, a good backstop for Ukraine.

The paltry charity of Western finance has agreed to a $3 billion interest freeze on its debt with European countries until the end of 2023, while with U.S. investment funds, to which Kiev owes 75% of its debt, the figure is considerably higher, just under $20 billion.

Figures in themselves are not stratospheric, but when added to the debts for the maintenance of current expenses, continuous and massive supplies of weapons and war infrastructure, troop training, spare parts and so on, the fiscal burden becomes enormous.

Back in 2015, during the domestic conflict, the finance minister had managed to postpone the payment of $19 billion scheduled in years 2015-22 to 2019-27. These too would now have to be paid, in addition to everything else.

Ukraine has already failed as a bourgeois State, and it’s totally in the hands of Western finance, American finance in particular, which can do with it as it wishes. For now, all aid takes the form of an anticipated Marshall Plan. What distinguishes the current one from the past one is the tragic difference in historical phase: in 1947 the reconstruction of war-torn Europe was an American investment in an upward cycle of capitalist recovery, the current one take place in a generalized crisis that more or less rapidly develops toward a worsening outcome for capitalism.

In the light of these summarized economic data about the conditions of the two direct belligerents (the indirect ones we haven’t considered here, although they’re fundamentally important in this dynamic) it’s clear that a disaster is set for Ukraine. This is the case even should it prevail militarily in some area, that it succeeds in “liberating” the invaded territories and maybe even Crimea.

The Russian state has also spent itself out of pocket in the preparation and maintenance of the war.

But for the two States, of which one will end up in the arms of the American-led West, existence will still be guaranteed.

On the contrary, those who are truly sacrificed in the war are and will be the proletarians, class brothers forced onto opposing fronts, on whom the whole burden of the postwar period will weigh after the unlikely peace. For them the world of bourgeois peace brings only more suffering and mourning, after all that was endured in wartime.