Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in West Africa, bordered by Mali to the north and Ghana to the south. Economically, it is a backward country, with much of the activity centered on agriculture, which employs about 80 percent of the labor force, with a substantial portion devoted to subsistence farming. There is a large peasant population in the North, while capitalist industry is concentrated in the South, near Ouagadougou, the new seat of government. The South is home to services, which accounted for 48 percent of GDP in 2023, while manufacturing is less than 10 percent, according to the World Bank. The country’s GDP per capita was only $774.84 in 2019; the population, estimated at 21 million as of 2020, is growing at the rapid rate of 2.86 percent annually.

The mercantile economy has historically been based on cotton cultivation. Gold exports have gained great importance in recent years. In 2018, gold and cotton accounted for 85 percent of exports.

Despite this, most of the rural population remains impoverished, particularly women, who have limited access to land and decision-making power. Although poverty has decreased from 47 percent in 2009 to about 40 percent in 2014, it remains widespread, especially in rural areas. The main causes of peasant poverty are: shortage of arable land, inadequate transportation and communication networks, climate, and low agricultural productivity.

Due to low levels of mechanization and limited crop diversification, Burkina’s agriculture remains vulnerable to climate change, particularly drought, making agricultural productivity volatile and dependent on international market prices.

Between 2010 and 2016, Burkina’s was one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, with average rates of 6.82 percent. However, in 2019 growth dropped to 5.68 percent due to a combination of increasing security threats from Islamist groups and the Covid-19 pandemic.

In 2024

The collapse of French imperialism in the Region first manifested itself in Mali, where two coups in less than a year demonstrated the decline of French influence. This departure of French dominance has paved the way for Russian involvement, particularly through the Wagner Group and other Russian private military companies (PMCs), which have since reorganized into the Africa Corps, which has established a presence in the Region. The bulk of these forces are in Mali, fighting Tuareg separatists.

The discontent that fueled these coups was not only due to the previous regimes’ inability to combat jihadist insurgencies; dramatic increases in food prices and widespread social instability also played a role.

By 2023 more than 2 million Burkinabes were internally displaced and nearly 150,000 had sought refuge in neighboring countries. The United Nations reports that nearly half of Burkina Faso’s territory is now out of government control, and the two main Islamic extremist groups-the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal- al Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)-are exploiting the chaos to expand their influence, particularly in the Northern Regions, where the peasant population is concentrated and where there are also large numbers of unemployed youth. These two groups often compete with each other for territory and influence, but have been known to cooperate against government forces.

The Islamist insurgency

Conditions for peasants in the north are particularly dire. As Islamist groups such as JNIM have tightened their control, peasants have found themselves caught between violence from these groups and harsh reprisals from the army. The north has seen some of the most brutal attacks. These include the execution of 223 civilians by the Burkinabe army in April 2024: authorities blamed this on Islamic fighters, claiming they often disguise themselves as soldiers.

In 2020, before the coup, previous President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, after a terrorist attack on a mining convoy a few months earlier, formed the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP), a citizen militia separate from the army created specifically to fight Islamist insurgents. After the coup, the junta government claimed to have recruited 90,000 troops. Islamist groups in the north often attack and ambush villages suspected of joining the VDP or the army.

Because of the conflict, the process of proletarianization has accelerated in Burkina Faso, with many peasants forced to abandon their land. As villages are overrun by Islamists or destroyed by military operations, these peasants have no choice to seek work but to migrate to urban centers or cross borders into neighboring countries. This migration is often driven by the need to send remittances to their families, who remain trapped in increasingly desperate conditions.

The Burkinabe junta has tried to militarize society as a solution to the crisis, but this has only exacerbated the suffering of the working class and peasantry. The state budget, strained by military commitments, led to the imposition of new taxes, exacerbating the dire conditions of the proletariat. The compulsory enlistment of union members in the army, as denounced by the Unité d’action syndicale (UAS), reflects the regime’s desperation to strengthen its military ranks.

Despite these efforts, the army’s effectiveness remains in question. In June 2024, the JNIM killed 107 soldiers in a single attack; in early August, more than 200 people, including 50 civilians, were killed in another ambush by the same group; later in the same month, it killed about 200 people in another attack. These continued military losses have weakened the legitimacy of the junta and its leader Traoré, who came to power on the basis of assurances that, unlike the previous administration, he would confront the Islamist insurgency. Not surprisingly, the government appears to be foiling an increasing number of coup attempts by internal and external forces.

Relations with Russia

Alignment with Russia has brought with it a new form of imperialist exploitation. The arrival of Russian military advisers and the delivery of grain from Russia are not signs of liberation but indicators of Burkina Faso’s continued dependence on foreign powers. As we have observed, “once again war becomes a way of sculpting society in the image and likeness of capital, framing the labor force with military discipline, creating proletarian reserve armies by depopulating rural areas, intercepting investment and aid from outside imperialist powers.” Increased Russian influence, especially in the form of military aid, has increased the militarization of Burkinabe society, with disastrous consequences for the proletariat and peasantry.

Human and ecological crisis

The recent heat wave in Burkina Faso, which has seen temperatures soar to over 45 degrees, underscores the environmental vulnerability of this nation, exacerbated by global capitalism, not least that of the large capitalist states, and its relentless exploitation of nature. The crisis has reached catastrophic levels. By the end of 2023, 42,000 Burkinabe were suffering from extreme food insecurity and millions more were close behind. The situation is severe in the blockaded cities under Islamist control, where restrictions on movement prevent aid delivery. More than 6,100 schools have been closed and health facilities are severely inadequate, leaving 3.6 million people without access to medical care.

The ongoing conflict and the junta’s militarized response have also fueled a surge in drug trafficking through the Sahel, with Burkina Faso becoming a transit land for narcotics destined for Europe. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that 1,466 kilograms of cocaine were seized in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2022, in sharp contrast to only 13 kilograms seized between 2013 and 2020. This surge in drug trafficking highlights the inability of Sahelian states to control their borders. In Burkina Faso, as we have said, the junta government controls only half of the country.

Support for the regime

Popular support for the junta, particularly among the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie, is largely the result of the regime’s nationalist and “anti-imperialist” rhetoric. However, this support is fragile and depends on the junta’s ability to deliver on its promises of security and stability. The recent 60-month extension of the junta’s rule under the guise of “national dialogue” has further extended power in the hands of Ibrahim Traoré, allowing him to run in future elections and consolidate his regime.

Sovereign control and foreign investment

In a move that indicates greater control over its natural resources, the government nationalized two gold mines, but at great cost. The mines had been the subject of a dispute between U.K.-based Endeavour Mining and Lilium Mining, a subsidiary of the U.S.-based investment firm Lilium Group. The agreement reached calls for Lilium to transfer ownership of the mines to the Burkinabe government, while Endeavour receives $60 million and a 3 percent royalty on up to 400,000 ounces of gold produced at one of the mines. While nationalization affirms Burkina Faso’s sovereignty over its resources, it also highlights the country’s continued dependence on foreign capital for revenue generation.

The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) approved a €6 million concessional financing package from the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA) for the construction of an 18 MW solar power plant in Dédougou, 250 km west of the capital Ouagadougou. Although the deal was originally agreed upon before the junta’s seizure of power, the West African and European bourgeoisies seem to have adapted to the new Sahel governments, seeing opportunities for profit in it. The solar project, owned in part by the AfDB and operated by French renewable energy company QAIR, intends to sell power to the government at a fixed price, as agreed before the coup.

The Confederation

Last year, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso-each of which has suffered coups in recent years-formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), with the main goal of strengthening security cooperation against Islamist groups and ethnic insurgencies destabilizing the region.

This year, the alliance evolved into the Confederation of Sahel States, with the expressed goal of further deepening economic and political ties between member countries. The ambition of the AES is to give itself a common currency. Discussions on sharing sectors such as agriculture, water and energy are part of broad plans to achieve “economic sovereignty.” AES has decided to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), accused of not providing adequate support against Islamist threats. It also declares to oppose the imperialist domination of Western powers, particularly France and the United States. However, as history has shown, true economic independence is impossible under capitalism, as these nations remain embedded in the global imperialist system dominated by more powerful imperialisms.

However, the formation of the Confederation would mark a significant development in the Region, the closer fusion of the Sahel states represents a progressive development: unifying the economy, infrastructure and institutions of different countries means unifying the working class as well. This is so even if the confederation comes to benefit the imperialisms of other countries, such as Russia, China, Turkey or Iran.

However, the trajectory of this new confederation remains uncertain. It remains to be seen to what extent this progressive element will be realized. It could evolve into a proxy for Russia in Africa, as an alternative to Western oppression, or it could collapse under external pressures, through coups, Islamist insurgencies or induced instability. Or the Confederation could prove merely symbolic and ineffective, quietly acquiescent to foreign powers and dependent on them as before, despite the rhetoric of “sovereignty” and “anti-imperialism.”