Germany occupies a central position in the European and global economic order. As the continent’s leading industrial power, despite the structural crisis it is undergoing, it exerts a decisive influence on the economic policies of the European Union, making German capitalism one of the pillars of the Western system, and it is significant, though not decisive, on the world market and in supply chains.

At the same time, Germany’s military role has grown significantly in recent years. Post-2022 rearmament -2022, the famous Zeitenwende, “epochal turning point,” and more active participation in NATO missions—in Lithuania, the Mediterranean, and Kosovo, as well as large-scale exercises in the Baltic and Poland—indicate a strengthening of its influence within the Alliance. However, while emerging as a major military actor, Germany remains bound by U.S. command and the historical limits of its strategic autonomy.

This evolution is not a contingent response to Russian intervention in Ukraine; it is part of a broader dynamic linked to the global crisis of capitalism and the resulting resurgence of rivalries, of which the war in Ukraine is only one manifestation. German rearmament is part of a general militarization of international relations among state giants, an explosion of capitalism’s historical contradictions.

The chapter presented at this meeting addresses the dual nature of contemporary Germany: on the one hand, a central economic power yet one undergoing a crisis of its production model; on the other, an expanding military actor.

In recent years, Germany has embarked on a strengthening of the Bundeswehr, described by the government as “the most ambitious military reform since the war.” The budget planned for 2026 is 108 billion euros, a significant increase from 2025, equivalent to 2.8% of GDP, up from 2.4% in 2025, with the goal of reaching 3.5% by 2029. The program includes investments aimed at modernizing land,

air, naval, and cyber capabilities, with a focus on space and integrated defense. Much of the spending will be absorbed by the domestic industry, with companies such as Rheinmetall and Diehl Defence at the forefront. However, operational and personnel limitations remain, preventing the Bundeswehr from meeting NATO standards in all ground and logistics units.

On the politico-military front, the strengthening of the Bundeswehr aims to consolidate Germany’s role within NATO and “European security,” or, more accurately, to ensure the defense of its own imperialist interests. Yet a technological and strategic dependence on the United States persists. German capitalism, like its continental counterparts, is seeking its own strategic autonomy, in a dynamic that will intensify rivalry with stronger imperialist powers. This dynamic is evident in the growing geopolitical disputes in the Arctic and in strategic regions such as Greenland.

Germany is, in fact, an imperialism without an empire. The rearmament of the Bundeswehr therefore serves not so much for defense but is part of a “broader European strategy aimed at ensuring autonomy and influence on the global stage,” vis-à-vis the superpowers: the need for the German (and European) bourgeoisie not to remain permanently crushed by the vise of its major imperialist competitors.

The national defense industry, supported by substantial contracts awarded to the private sector, not only modernizes the army but also creates an industrial and technological capacity capable of competing in the lucrative arms market.

The growth in military spending and the planning of strategic infrastructure show how the German bourgeoisie is preparing for future conflict scenarios in which military confrontation will become inevitable. However, operational limitations—ground units that are not fully efficient, logistical shortcomings, and insufficient personnel—make this autonomy partial and dependent on the United States and its technological and command systems.

The diplomatic dimension confirms this weakness. China’s cancellation of the German foreign minister’s visit to China on October 24 is significant. Disagreements over semiconductors and rare earths, along with China’s stance toward Russia, reveal a German capitalism that is indeed integrated into global financial and commercial flows but lacks coercive tools equivalent to those of Washington or Beijing. This weakness—military, technological, and diplomatic—drives European imperialisms, each on its own account, to strengthen their internal forces, preparing themselves on the global stage to enter future imperialist conflicts not entirely unarmed.

Another example of a lack of autonomous strength is the dispute over Greenland, which has further highlighted European impotence within the so-called Pax Americana. The Arctic territory, formally part of the Kingdom of Denmark but endowed with broad autonomy, holds strategic importance due to the presence of critical mineral resources and control over the new Arctic routes made accessible by melting ice. Faced with U.S. claims, the European Union and Germany have reacted solely by appealing to the now-buried, ever-mythical international law. Any European military presence in the Arctic is envisioned within the NATO perimeter, that is, under U.S. control.

The German bourgeoisie, like that of all old capitalist systems, would like to revive the lost vitality of its economic and industrial apparatus. But the arc of a nation’s historical evolution cannot be traced backward. In fact, in recent years, the trend has solidified even among German industrial firms to relocate production and investments. A growing share of companies is moving production abroad, where they find lower costs, fewer regulations and burdens, and lower costs for various rents than in socially decrepit and parasitic Europe. In 2024, 37% of industrial firms reported considering production cuts or moving production abroad, up from 32% in 2023 and 21% in 2022. The percentage reaches 45% among the most energy-intensive companies. This phenomenon is most pronounced among companies with over 500 employees. Investments are flowing to Asia, North America, and Eastern Europe.

The loss of production capacity in energy-intensive civilian sectors and the relocation of part of manufacturing represent the structural complement to the Zeitenwende: while capital tends to shift production and investments toward more favorable environments, the state concentrates fiscal and political resources in the military, technology, and “dual-use” sectors, ensuring the conditions for the reproduction of the bourgeoisie’s economic and political power. The contradiction between rearmament and deindustrialization cannot be resolved, but only managed and institutionalized, reflecting a transformation of the forms through which the bourgeoisie seeks to force the accumulation of capital and defend its hegemonic position within the European and global system.